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SHALENDRA SHARMA
India in 2010
Robust Economics amid Political Stasis
ABSTRACT
The Congress Party, although in a strong position to improve matters in 2010, gener-
ally proved disappointing, especially in the realm of governance and public policy. 
However, Indian authorities did demonstrate the ability to manage the economy well 
in a challenging international economic climate. President Obama’s three-day trip 
helped to reinvigorate bilateral ties, but India’s relations with China and Pakistan 
remained testy.
KEYWORDS:  Barack Obama, U.S.-India nuclear deal, Kashmir, caste-census, India
Every year, India celebrates Independence Day on August 15. It is a 
time when Indians reflect on the “state of the nation.” In 2010, as the coun-
try marked its 63rd birthday, the national mood was ambivalent. On the 
one hand, there was genuine pride in the country’s accomplishments, es-
pecially its rising international stature; on the other, growing apprehension 
existed about myriad lingering domestic problems that were perceived to 
be increasingly out of control. The fervent expectation that the reinvigo-
rated Congress Party, which had won the 2009 general elections in a con-
vincing manner, would use its new mandate to ameliorate the nation’s many 
challenges, seems to have dissipated. Congress Party leaders including 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, party president Sonia Gandhi, and her 
son and heir apparent Rahul Gandhi remain popular. But general disgust 
with the inability of the self-serving “political class” to move beyond “pol-
itics as usual” and deal with the nation’s many pressing problems remained 
palpable within the citizenry.
Shalendra Sharma is Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco. He is author of 
China and India in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge, 2009). Email: <sharmas@usfca.edu>.
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THE POLITICAL:  MISSED OPPORTuNITIES 
AND GROWING DISAPPOINTMENT
Although Prime Minister Singh repeatedly described the so-called Naxal 
menace (e.g., the decades-old Maoist insurgency) as “India’s gravest security 
threat,” the government’s inept response to Naxalites’ routine acts of violence 
and lawlessness only underscored the perception that the authorities were 
ill-prepared to deal with fanatical ideologues.1 In April 2010, the Naxalites 
launched a well-coordinated attack on patrolling paramilitary forces in 
Dantewada District in the state of Chhattisgarh in which 76 security force 
personnel were killed. In May, the Naxalites killed 27 policemen in another 
ambush and were suspected of involvement in a train crash that killed 147 in 
West Midnapore District of West Bengal in late May. In response, Union 
Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram could only pledge that “the 
problem of left-wing extremism will be overcome in the next three years.”2 
Chidambaram’s vague response failed to instill confidence in the public. The 
apparatus of the mighty Indian state seemed paralyzed in the face of the 
Naxalites’ defiance (except for arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, and 
harassment of their suspected supporters by the security forces). The entire 
spectacle gave credence to the opposition’s charge that the Singh government 
is ineffectual in maintaining law and order and protecting the civil rights of 
all citizens.
The escalating civil unrest and violence in the contested state of Jammu & 
Kashmir further underscored the problems of worsening internal governance 
in India and raised fears of a protracted armed insurgency in the troubled 
region. What began with a few angry students throwing stones at Indian 
security forces and the accidental death of a teenager as a result of an explod-
ing teargas shell quickly morphed into a broad-based popular mobilization 
involving huge protest marches, reminiscent of what plagued the region a 
decade and half ago. In the past summer alone, there were some 900 clashes 
between protesters and security forces that left more than 100 civilians dead, 
mostly from gunshot wounds from Indian troops. The armed insurgency 
1. The Naxalite movement dates back to a 1967 peasant uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal. It is 
estimated that the Maoists’ area of operations (known as the “Red Corridor”) covers some 40,000 
square kilometers across central and eastern India, concentrated mainly in the states of Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. Over the past five years, Naxalite violence has 
claimed the lives of over 10,000 civilians and security personnel.
2. “Will Overcome Maoist Problem in Three Years: Chidambaram,” Times of India, July 29, 
2010, at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6233378.cms?prtpage=1>. 
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involving indigenous Kashmiri groups and increasingly Islamist jihadi 
groups also continues.
New Delhi’s indifference to the Kashmiris’ political aspirations and Indian 
troops’ excessive reliance on deadly force further galvanized the protesters. 
Although Pakistan was largely behind the insurgency in the 1990s, the cur-
rent conflagration is home-grown, rooted primarily in widespread anger 
against the heavy-handed Indian military presence in the state and the Kash-
miris’ growing sense of disenfranchisement. Despite the fact that both the 
central and state governments have poured massive amounts of economic 
assistance into the state, there is very little to show for it. In fact, New Delhi 
seems to have squandered all opportunities to deal effectively with the Kash-
mir problem. State elections in Jammu & Kashmir in 2008 witnessed excep-
tionally high voter participation, with about 60% of the eligible electorate 
voting. At that time, incoming Chief Minister Omar Abdullah (a scion of 
Kashmir’s leading political family) seemed to have the political wherewithal 
to finally mitigate Kashmir’s many schisms and pull the state toward stabil-
ity. Yet today, all this seems a long time ago. The political arena increasingly 
belongs to demagogic separatist leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani who 
enjoy growing support because their secessionist demands have found a new 
generation of sympathetic ears within the state’s Muslim majority.3
Political expediency again triumphed in India this year when the Singh 
administration agreed to add “caste” to the census exercise for the first time 
in 80 years. Although “caste” has been a pervasive part of India’s sociocultural 
fabric for over two millennia, its politicization has been relatively recent. 
Caste-based politics received its official sanction when the late Prime Minis-
ter V. P. Singh made the divisive Mandal Commission issue (a caste-based 
affirmative action program) part of official government policy in 1990. Since 
then, demagogic and self-serving politicians, including those from the two 
largest political parties in India (the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party 
[BJP, Indian People’s Party]), have exploited caste for political gain. This is in 
spite of the fact that the Indian Constitution, in its attempts to marginalize 
caste, explicitly outlaws caste discrimination. However, this has hardly pre-
vented political parties from exploiting caste for electoral gain.4
3. “Paradise Continues to Crash and Burn,” ibid., August 7, 2010, at <http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/articleshow/6270801.cms?prtpage=1#ixzz0vx666dJq>. 
4. The British enumerated population based on “castes” from 1871 to 1931. After independence 
in 1947, the government discontinued the caste-based census.
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Home Minister Chidambaram announced in early September 2010 that the 
enumeration of caste—recording the names, addresses, and caste of some 1.2 
billion citizens at an estimated cost of 30 billion-40 billion rupees (US$645 
million-$860 million)—will be carried out in June-September 2011. This raised 
fears that the caste-based politics of “quotas” and “reservations” would be fur-
ther legitimized. Ostensibly, the rationale for the official enumeration of caste 
is to garner more-reliable data to help target government assistance programs 
to deserving groups. Nonetheless, the concern was raised that the exercise 
would be an invitation to political parties, in particular caste-based parties, to 
demand even more quotas at the expense of the truly disadvantaged. There is, 
in fact, legitimate reason to fear that parochial caste and communal identities 
will become further reinforced at the expense of common citizenship as more 
caste-based political players enter the political scene.
Although chronic corruption and the abuse of power in high places have 
long been commonplace, allegations of widespread corruption in the vener-
ated world of Indian cricket captivated the nation in 2010 because they in-
volved an unlikely protagonist—Shashi Tharoor, the new “golden boy” of 
Indian politics.5 Valued at an estimated $4 billion, Indian Cricket’s Premier 
League (IPL) has long had its share of scandal and malfeasance. However, 
when two new IPL teams were sold at auction for a total of 32 billion rupees 
($703 million) in March to well-connected insiders, the problem of illegal 
betting came to light as never before. At the center of the storm was Tharoor, 
a former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Communications and 
Public Information, a Congress Party member of Parliament (MP) from the 
Thiruvananthapuram constituency in Kerala, and a minister of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs. Brash, attention-seeking, and known for his bourgeois tastes, 
Tharoor was alleged to have misused his office to get lucrative shares in the 
IPL cricket franchise of Cochin worth an estimated $16 million for his girl-
friend. As the extent of the malfeasance and audacity of privileged insiders 
became public, Tharoor was forced by the prime minister to resign from his 
External Affairs post in April. The following day, Finance Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee announced that an investigation would be launched.
5. According to Transparency International’s 2010 ranking of nations based on the “level of cor-
ruption” in the public sector, India was ranked 87 out of the 178 countries surveyed. In 2009, India 
ranked 84 out of 178. China ranked ahead of India at 78. See Indianexpress.com, “India Falls Deeper 
into the Corruption Cauldron: Report,” October 27, 2010, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/
news/india-falls-deeper-into-the-corruption-cauldron/703347/0>.
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A RESIL IENT AND ROBuST ECONOMY
The one area where the Singh administration gets good grades is its handling 
of the economy. India’s economy, which proved resilient during the global 
financial crisis of 2007–09, returned to its pre-crisis growth rate of 8.6% in 
January-March 2010, making India one of the world’s fastest growing econo-
mies.6 The faster than expected recovery was the result of strong domestic 
consumption, expansion in private and public investments, a sharp rebound 
in manufacturing, and growth in farm output.7 As of June, India’s foreign 
exchange reserves stood at $271 billion, an increase of $9.88 billion over the 
same period in 2009. Not surprisingly, a jubilant Mukherjee noted that the 
country’s overall economic growth “would be not less than 8.5% in fiscal 
2010,” and that it “would not be difficult to achieve 9% growth as being 
projected in my Budget from the year 2011–12.”8
Yet, it should be noted that policymakers have not used the economic 
rebound to rein in the central government’s deficit, which has grown to 7% 
of gross domestic product (GDP)—one of the highest levels in the develop-
ing world. If left unchecked, such large deficits and high levels of national 
debt will make it exceedingly difficult for the government to meet its desired 
expenditures in education, health care, poverty alleviation, and modern in-
frastructure.9 Similarly, the authorities have not adequately tackled inflation, 
which for months has hovered in the range of 8.5% to 10.5%. Rising food 
prices caused by growing demand and a poor monsoon have a particularly 
negative impact on the poor. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the Singh 
administration has done little to reform financial services, especially the 
banking sector. India’s public sector banks, which dominate the marketplace, 
lack both the resources and expertise to meet the needs of the country’s so-
phisticated private and corporate sectors. Without reforms, India’s economic 
expansion could potentially stagnate. Despite the Singh administration’s 
oft-stated goal of strengthening the financial sector, including expanding the 
6. During 2003–08, India’s economic growth averaged 8.8% a year, before slumping to 6.7% 
during the global credit crisis.
7. “India’s Surprising Economic Miracle,” Economist, September 30, 2010, at <http://www5.
economist.com/node/17147648/print>.
8. “Indian Economy to Grow at 8.5 Per Cent Rate in 2010–11, Says Pranab,” September 16, 2010, 
Economic Times, at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6628300.cms>. 
9. International Monetary Fund, “India Rebounds, Needs to Return to Reform Agenda,” IMF 
Survey online, February 5, 2010, at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/CAR
020810A.htm>.
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corporate bond markets and enhancing the role of foreign investors, little of 
substance has actually been implemented.
THE SAGA OF THE u.S . - INDIA NuCLEAR DEAL
Although Prime Minister Singh invested much energy toward a successful 
conclusion of his signature contribution to foreign policy—the U.S.-India 
nuclear agreement—its problematic outcome was disappointing. Even with 
the signing of the landmark U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement in October 
2008, implementation was contingent on resolving three technical and bu-
reaucratic issues.10 These included (1) a “reprocessing arrangement” specifying 
how India could use spent nuclear fuel originating from the U.S., (2) setting 
up a “Civil Nuclear Liability Regime” to limit the liability of American com-
panies operating in India (especially those planning to build reactors) in case 
of nuclear accidents, and (3) a written assurance by the Indian government on 
non-proliferation as stipulated under U.S. Department of Energy rules. Once 
these three issues were resolved bilaterally, the entire agreement was to be sent 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for confirmation and to 
set up supervisory arrangements for the reprocessing facility, including guide-
lines on handling and transporting spent nuclear fuel.
Eight months of contentious negotiations on “reprocessing arrangements 
and procedures,” concluded in March 2010 when the Obama administration 
announced that it had successfully resolved the nuclear fuel reprocessing 
agreement with India pursuant to Article 6 (iii) of the U.S.-India civil nu-
clear cooperation agreement—also known as the “123 agreement.” The repro-
cessing agreement was signed by Meera Shankar, India’s ambassador in the 
U.S., and U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns on July 29. 
With this out of the way, the two countries came one step closer to imple-
menting the 2008 U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal. The unexpectedly long 
negotiations involved the “precise arrangements and procedures” for repro-
cessing U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel.11 The major sticking-point that caused 
the delay had to do with differences over the termination clauses in the 
10. For details on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, see Shalendra D. Sharma, China and India in the 
Age of Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. ch. 6.
11. Reprocessing involves the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel. However, because 
plutonium can be reused as the fissile core for nuclear weapons, access to the reprocessing technol-
ogy or the right to reprocess is strictly monitored. The U.S. has granted reprocessing rights only to 
the EU and Japan.
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agreement and the fact that the U.S. wanted a single reprocessing facility, 
whereas India correctly pointed out that the original “123 agreement” envis-
aged multiple facilities. Although India made a spirited case, arguing that 
France and Russia (with which India has similar arrangements) have not 
imposed any restrictions on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technology, the U.S. was not moved. Instead, a more modest compromise 
was struck. The agreement allows India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at two 
facilities, and to make “further additions and modifications” in the future. 
Clearly, this provision is a significant gain for India, allowing it to augment 
and modernize its reprocessing capacity without having to reopen negotia-
tions if the need arises for more reactors.
Because nuclear reprocessing involves separating and processing spent fuel, 
including that which is potentially weapons-grade, the Obama administration 
insisted on putting in place an inspection regime designed to prevent India 
from ever diverting U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel to its military program. Under 
the agreement, India would be able to reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear material 
under safeguards instituted by the IAEA. India will have to clearly separate 
operation of its civil and military reactors and also make certain that reprocess-
ing takes place in the civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards and supervision. 
India, in collaboration with the U.S., has already designated two sites—one in 
Andhra Pradesh and the other in Gujarat as “nuclear parks” with state-of-the-
art facilities for the use of U.S. commercial nuclear technology. Even though 
the U.S. will not provide any technology for reprocessing, it will allow India to 
use its own technology to reprocess spent American fuel. More important, 
reactors designated as military facilities and the nuclear fuel produced in them 
will be exempt from inspections or safeguards.
The second obstacle to implementing the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear 
agreement—legislative passage of a “Civil Nuclear Liability Regime” to limit 
the liability of American companies operating in India—also proved diffi-
cult. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Robert Blake publicly stated in late March 2010 that the U.S. hoped the 
Indian government would proceed quickly on the passage of the nuclear liabil-
ity legislation. He was subsequently “gratified to learn that the President of 
India had announced India’s intention to introduce this Bill in Parliament” as 
soon as possible.12 The U.S. made it clear that it was in India’s interests to 
12. Narayan Lakshman, “U.S., India Complete Reprocessing Negotiations,” The Hindu, March 
29, 2010. 
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move expeditiously because American companies would not be able to sell 
state-of-the-art nuclear technologies to India unless the bill limiting their 
liability became law. For its part, India stressed the urgent need to operation-
alize the nuclear deal because lifting the three-decade-long U.S. moratorium 
on nuclear trade with India would enable American companies to participate 
in India’s booming civil nuclear energy sector and let India modernize its 
ailing civil nuclear energy capabilities.
However, the Singh administration inexplicably withdrew the “Civil 
Nuclear Liability Bill,” after listing it for introduction. On March 15, the 
government abruptly announced its decision to postpone it by referring it 
to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology. Ap-
parently, the Lok Sabha (People’s House, the lower house of Parliament) 
Speaker had received numerous objections from opposition parties and felt 
that the government needed more time to fully respond. To the opposi-
tion, the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill was grossly unfair because it excluded 
foreign suppliers from liability in case of an accident, making only the 
operators liable—albeit with a relatively low cap of Rs 500 crore (around 
$110 million). Moreover, because the bill stipulated that no compensation 
could be claimed after 10 years following an accident (which is actually an 
international legal norm), the opposition charged that the government was 
caving in to American pressure in trying to push the bill through without 
necessary changes.
On May 7, the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill was finally brought to floor 
of the Lok Sabha. The opposition BJP-led National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) coalition and the Left parties labeled the government’s decision 
“illegal” and “unconstitutional,” further characterizing the bill as being 
“anti-people.” However, this did not prevent it from being introduced. The 
main sticking point—the liability cap for the operator—was seen as grossly 
inadequate. In fact, even as the government was seeking permission to 
introduce the bill, MPs from the opposition including the BJP, Commu-
nist Party of India (CPI), and Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) 
were alleging that the bill violated Article 21 of the Constitution, guaran-
teeing the right to life.
The June 7 verdict by a trial court in the city of Bhopal further compli-
cated matters. The verdict held seven Union Carbide officials guilty of crimi-
nal negligence in the 1984 gas leak from the company’s manufacturing plant 
in Bhopal that killed and maimed thousands. Nonetheless, the court 
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sentenced these company officials to only two years’ imprisonment and im-
posed light fines of Rs 100,000 (about US$2,200).
This verdict and later sentencing gave new fodder to the bill’s critics. 
Drawing parallels with the Bhopal tragedy (the long delay in getting justice 
and the relatively minuscule fine), the BJP demanded that the government 
withdraw from the nuclear agreement, saying it was aimed at “pleasing 
the Americans.” This marked a significant shift in the BJP stance. The 
government indicated it was willing to review the Rs 500 crore cap on li-
ability for operators, and behind-the-scenes negotiations with the opposi-
tion continued.
On August 18, the Standing Committee on Science and Technology re-
sponsible for reviewing the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill presented its report 
to both houses of Parliament. The bill seemed on its way to approval because 
the report had explicitly addressed the BJP’s major concern by recommend-
ing “clear-cut” accountability of suppliers and raising the compensation cap 
to Rs 1,500 crore ($330 million), but this did not happen. The following day, 
the BJP announced that it was going to reject the proposed bill, accusing the 
government of unilaterally changing its wording. Apparently, The Hindu, 
one of India’s leading dailies, discovered that the report had diluted the pro-
vision on supplier’s liability by “making some changes” that were not a part 
of the original draft, thus leaving BJP leaders red-faced. Specifically, it was 
pointed out that the standing committee report provided a potential loop-
hole for suppliers of nuclear technologies by specifying that “the right to 
recourse” depended on a supplier-operator agreement to this effect, and not 
necessarily on general Indian law. On August 20, even as the government 
dismissed the opposition’s actions as “political grandstanding,” it also agreed 
to amend Clause 17 of the report. With this hurdle out of the way, it was 
assumed that the legislation would go to the Lok Sabha for consideration; 
yet, another fresh controversy was brewing.
On August 21, the BJP and Left parties once again accused the government 
of clandestinely diluting the potential liability of suppliers with another uni-
lateral wording change, and threatened to block the legislation. This time, 
the offending word was “intent” placed into Clause 17, which could poten-
tially make suppliers immune from legal liability unless it could be demon-
strated that a nuclear incident occurred as a result of an “intent to cause 
nuclear damage”—defined broadly to include defective equipment or sub-
standard services. Sensing political gridlock, Prime Minister Singh personally 
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intervened to assure Parliament that the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill did not 
compromise India’s interests, and the word “intent” was deleted.13
On August 25, the Lok Sabha finally gave its approval to the Civil Nuclear 
Liability Bill, after months of political wrangling and the inclusion of 18 
amendments into the legislation. For Singh, passage marked the “completion 
of a journey to end the apartheid against India in the field of atomic 
power.”14 Five days later, the bill was also adopted by the Rajya Sabha (upper 
house). The ceremonial signing of the legislation into law by the president of 
India finally made it more possible for India to engage in civil nuclear com-
merce with other countries.
Yet, just when it appeared that closure was finally achieved on the conten-
tious nuclear issue, American nuclear energy companies raised concerns 
about India’s new liability law and demanded that India amend the law fur-
ther to bring its nuclear liability regime in concert with international norms. 
Specifically, they demanded that India establish an unambiguous civil nu-
clear liability regime to further limit supplier liability in case of a nuclear 
accident before agreeing to do business in India. In its efforts to allay such 
concerns, India, on October 27, signed the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage—an international convention on nu-
clear energy accident liability designed to establish a uniform international 
legal regime for victim compensation. Although, India claims that its na-
tional laws are consistent with the international framework, not everyone, in 
particular American nuclear industry representatives and businesses, is fully 
satisfied. Thus, whether India’s new liability law is in keeping with interna-
tional norms will ultimately be determined by the nuclear industry—both 
international and domestic.
INDIA AND THE u.S . :  OBAMA’S  vIS IT
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated the Obama administra-
tion’s unequivocal commitment to improving ties with India during the in-
augural U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue held in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 
13. “LS Passes Nuclear Bill after Govt Drops Contentious Clause,” at <http://in.news.yahoo.
com/20/20100825/1416/tnl-ls-passes-nulcear-bill-after-govt-dr_3.html>.
14. Vinay Kumar and J. Balaji, “Intent Dropped: Lok Sabha Adopts Nuclear Liability Bill,” The 
Hindu, August 26, 2010, at <http://www.thehindu.com/2010/08/26/stories/2010082653670100.
htm>. 
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2010, co-chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna. President 
Obama, in a rare and dramatic gesture, attended a reception held at the State 
Department to honor the Indian delegation, in an attempt to ease India’s 
concern that his administration was viewing bilateral ties through the prism 
of Pakistan and China. Obama not only announced his plans to visit India 
in November but also described the country as “a responsible global power.” 
He heralded Indo-U.S. relations as “one of the defining partnerships of the 
21st century” and said the ties were “at the highest of priorities for my ad-
ministration and for me personally as president.”15
On November 6, Obama arrived in India’s financial capital, Mumbai. He 
made a symbolic first stop at the Taj Hotel (the target of bloody terrorist at-
tacks in November 2008), paid homage to Mohandas Gandhi at the home-
turned-museum where Gandhi once lived, engaged in a town hall-style 
discussion with young students, and in New Delhi, gave a ceremonial ad-
dress to Parliament. Obama also made no secret that his top priority was to 
strengthen the U.S.-India economic partnership by “promoting trade, boost-
ing exports, and creating jobs at home.”16 With American business leaders 
and chief executives at his side, Obama highlighted a list of trade deals with 
India totaling some $10 billion. These included a $4.1 billion agreement for 
the Indian Air Force to purchase 10 C-17 military transport planes from the 
Boeing Corporation, and an $822 million deal for General Electric to pro-
vide the Indian Aeronautical Development Agency with 107 F414 engines for 
the Tejas light-combat aircraft, among others. In a decision welcomed by 
both Indian and U.S. business interests, the president announced that the 
U.S. would relax long-standing restrictions on sending India “dual-use” tech-
nologies, whose export had been banned after India’s nuclear tests in 1998.
If the Indian officialdom remained obsequious, it was the students at the 
town hall meeting who asked Obama questions on the minds of many Indi-
ans: Why did he not mention Pakistan as home to the gunmen responsible for 
the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai? Why has the U.S. failed to label Pakistan 
“a terrorist state?” Is the Obama administration holding negotiations with the 
15. See Narayan Lakshman, “After Strategic Dialogue, Big Push to U.S.-India Cooperation,” 
ibid., June 4, 2010, <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article446469.ece?css=print>; 
Chidanand Rajghatta, “Obama Pledges to Make History with India in November Visit,” Times of 
India, June 4, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6010228.cms?prtpage=1>. 
16. Julianna Goldman and Hans Nichols, “Obama, Visiting India, Promotes Trade, Democracy 
on First Asia Tour Stop,” Bloomberg News, November 7, 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
print/2010-11-07/obama-says-u-s-congress-elections-may-spur-some-midcourse-corrections-.html>.
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Taliban and what does this mean for India?17 The president avoided direct 
answers but stuck to his script, saying that the U.S. would not “impose” it-
self on Indo-Pakistan relations (e.g., the Kashmir dispute) and that Pakistan’s 
progress in fighting terrorism “was not quick enough.”
While all these surely pleased his hosts, Obama reserved his most dramatic 
announcement for later in his trip. In his speech to Parliament, the president 
announced that India is not “emerging” but has “emerged,” and that the 
U.S. was prepared to support India’s bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. 
Security Council (UNSC).18 Obama noted that “the just and sustainable 
international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is ef-
ficient, effective, credible and legitimate. . . . That is why I can say today—in 
the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that 
includes India as a permanent member.”19 Not surprisingly, this announce-
ment brought the loudest applause during Obama’s speech. Of course, this 
does not mean that India will automatically join the Security Council, a 
process that could take years. To India’s delight, Obama also agreed to push 
for its membership in a number of key multilateral institutions that control 
global trade in nuclear and “dual use” technologies, including the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA
Shortly after President Obama endorsed India’s bid for a permanent seat on 
the UNSC, Pakistan expressed “serious concern and strong disappointment.” 
Officials said it was “incomprehensible that the U.S. has sought to support 
India, whose credentials with respect to observing the U.N. Charter 
principles and international law are at best chequered.” Islamabad warned 
that, given India’s “disregard of Security Council Resolutions on Jammu and 
Kashmir and gross and systematic violations of the fundamental human 
17. Sheryl Stolberg, “In India, Obama Faces Questions from Students,” New York Times, 
November 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/world/asia/08prexy.html?src=me& 
pagewanted=print>.
18. Unlike both the U.K. and France, the U.S. had never provided unequivocal support for In-
dia’s claim for a permanent seat on the expanded Security Council, prior to Obama’s announce-
ment. The best the U.S. could afford in the past was a consolation prize, supporting a “bigger role” 
for India in the U.N. 
19. Erica Werner, “Obama Backs India Bid for UN Security Council Seat,” Associated Press, 
November 8, 2010, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101108/ap_on_re_us/obama_asia/print>.
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rights of the Kashmiri people,” the endorsement would have “grave implica-
tions” for peace and stability in South Asia.20
The Pakistani position is a good reflection of the current state of Indo-
Pak relations, characterized by acrimony and deadlock. Nevertheless, de-
spite Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai attacks and its refusal to crack 
down on some terrorist groups operating within its borders, India has re-
peatedly said it is ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, under the condi-
tions that there is no third-party intervention on Kashmir and that terrorist 
activity be deterred.21
Over the past year, Sino-Indian relations have been on a roller coaster, 
swinging from tension and acrimony to dialogue and diplomatic engage-
ment. Senior officials from both countries visited each other’s capitals. The 
highlight of these visits was Indian President Pratibha Patil’s six-day trip to 
China in late May, during which she had discussions with President Hu 
Jintao and other senior officials. In an attempt to ameliorate Chinese con-
cerns, Patil reiterated that India considers Tibet an integral part of China, 
while renewing New Delhi’s commitment to deter “anti-China activities.”22 
For her part, Patil sought China’s support for India’s Security Council bid. 
Chinese leaders said they “supported India’s aspirations and desire to play a 
greater role” and agreed to “strengthen their co-operation on Security Coun-
cil reforms.”23 But they stopped short of offering clear support.
The warmth of these visits aside, tensions between the two neighbors 
reached their zenith in August when China refused to grant a visa to India’s 
northern army commander, General B. S. Jaswal, on grounds that he also 
commanded security operations in Kashmir—a territory China considers 
in dispute. India suspended all defense cooperation with China. High-level 
dialogue resumed only after a brief meeting between Prime Minister Singh 
and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during the ASEAN summit in Hanoi in 
late October. Nonetheless, the on-again, off-again relationship has not 
20. “Pak Slams U.S. for Backing India’s UNSC Bid,” The Hindu, November 10, 2010, <http://
www.thehindu.com/news/international/article878341.ece?homepage=true&css=print>. 
21. “India Willing to Discuss All Issues with Pakistan,” Economic Times, September 26, 2010, 
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6628300.cms?prtpage=1http://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/articleshow/6628300.cms?prtpage=1>. 
22. Saibal Dasgupta, “China Seeks Assurance from Patil on Tibet Issue,” Times of India, May 28, 
2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5986186.cms?prtpage=1>. 
23. Vidya Subrahmaniam, “Pratibha Seeks China Backing for Permanent UNSC Seat,” The 
Hindu, May 28, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/2010/05/28/stories/2010052854791200.htm>. 
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severely impacted bilateral economic relations. Since 2008, China has been 
India’s largest trading partner, and India is China’s seventh largest export 
market and tenth largest trade partner. Bilateral trade of $43 billion in 
2009 is expected to reach $60 billon by the end of 2010. Clearly, growing 
economic interdependence does not automatically translate into political 
cooperation.
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